“The vast Pacific Ocean has enough space for two large countries like the United States and China,” claimed
Chinese President Xi Jinping during his intimate retreat in Sunnylands
with his American counterpart, Barack Obama, back in 2013. Optimistic
about a new era of cooperation, Xi espoused a “new model of great power relations.”
Three years on, the two superpowers are on a collision course in the South China Sea, the world’s most important waterway. Intensified Sino-American rivalry, and its regional reverberations, was well on display during the latest edition of the Asian Security Summit,
better known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, which brought together the
world’s leading defense officials and experts in Singapore.
Though less strident than expected, the United States Secretary of
Defense Ash Carter’s speech was an attempt to provide unequivocal
justification for America’s growing military footprint in Asia and its
deepening security alliances with a wide array of regional powers. He
boasted about Washington’s huge military qualitative edge, namely its
new undersea drones, the Virginia-class submarines, and the new B-21
Long-Range Strike Bomber. Presenting America as a benign power, he
lauded its willingness to share “most advanced capabilities to the
Asia-Pacific” partners, particularly Japan and Australia.
His tone, however, shifted once theme of China and its regional
ambitions came up. He openly accused China of taking “some expansive and
unprecedented actions” that put into doubt its “strategic intentions.”
He warned, “if these actions continue,” China would end up erecting a
“Great Wall of self-isolation.” Carter went so far as characterizing
China’s actions as “provocative, destabilizing and self-isolating.”
Defense ministers of other Western and regional powers, from France
to India, Japan and Vietnam, also expressed their concerns with China’s
growing military footprint in the South China Sea. Over the past two
years, China has reclaimed
3,200 acres (1,295 hectares) of land across disputed waters, building
humongous artificial islands that host dual-purpose (civilian and
military) facilities. No other claimant country, including Vietnam, comes even close.
In recent months, China has deployed advanced military hardware
to some of its islands in Paracel and Spratly chain of islands, ranging
from high-frequency radars and surface-to-air-missiles to
state-of-the-art fighter jets. The growing presence of Chinese fishermen-cum-militia forces is another source of concern. As China builds a sprawling network of military facilities in the area, there is growing fear that China may soon be in a position to establish an ‘exclusion zone’, denying freedom of overflight and navigation to regional and external military forces.
Protecting the Commons:
Carter mentioned the word “principled” 38 times, trying to present
China’s activities in the South China Sea as a threat to international
law and the interest of the broader international community,
particularly when it comes to global commons such as freedom of
navigation and overflight.
One theme that often appeared in the speeches of and exchanges among
top defense officials was the Philippines’ arbitration case against
China. Beginning in 2013, few months after a dangerous standoff over
the Scarborough Shoal, Manila filed a case against Beijing at an
arbitral tribunal under the aegis of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
A final verdict is expected in coming weeks. Most experts anticipate an unfavorable outcome for China,which has
boycotted the whole proceedings; questioned the jurisdiction and
competence of arbitration bodies under UNCLOS to oversee the South China
Sea disputes; and accused the Philippines of violating prior bilateral
and multilateral agreements by initiating a compulsory arbitration case
at The Hague.
The Philippines’ arbitration case, however, has gained momentum, overcoming both admissibility and jurisdictional hurdles. Anticipating a landmark verdict, the influential Group of Seven (G7)industrialized
powers, Australia, and practically all relevant players in the region
have either openly or indirectly expressed their support for the
arbitration proceedings.
During the US-ASEAN meeting in Sunnyland earlier this year, both
sides mentioned the centrality of international law, particularly
UNCLOS, in resolving South China Sea disputes. The joint statement calls for “full respect for legal…processes” by parties concerned. To China’s consternation, Southeast Asian powers such as Indonesia and Vietnam, which have closely followed the Philippines’ legal maneuver against China, have also threatened similar actions.
China’s Pushback:
In response, China has sought to undermine the legitimacy of the arbitral body by setting up its own international arbitration bodies, while rallying the support of up to 40
countries — mostly poor, and many landlocked/continental — to question
the Philippines’ arbitration case. Meanwhile, it has also reached out to
the incoming Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte, who has expressed his willingness to reopen bilateral dialogue with China and even pursue a joint development agreement if necessary.
“We were not isolated in the past, we are not isolated and we will
not be isolated,” Chinese Admiral Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of general
staff of the People’s Liberation Army, asserted during his speech at the
Shangri-La Dialogue. He began, in a rather composed manner, by
providing a broad overview of China’s contribution to international
security and development, ranging from its peacekeeping operations in
Africa to its generous development aid and large-scale infrastructure
investments in developing countries around the world.
Similar to Carter, Sun presented his country as a responsible
global power. The Chinese admiral, however, shifted to a higher pitch,
with a more pugnacious rhythm, once he discussed the South China Sea
disputes. He singled out the Philippines, in particular. He accused,
quite astonishingly, the Southeast Asian country of being “the first
country to invade the South China Sea” and undermining regional peace by
initiating an arbitration proceeding without securing China’s consent.
Claiming that China’s claim in the area
is based on objective history, something that few non-Chinese experts
will agree with, he warned that “Chinese people believe in truth, not
heresy” and that “belligerence doesn’t make peace”. Admiral Sung went on
accusing America and its allies of indulging in “cold war mentality and
prejudice”, warning that China is “not afraid of any trouble.”
Asserting that China bears no responsibility for rising tensions in the
area, and that it holds no hegemonic ambitions, the Chinese official
accused, albeit cryptically, America and its allies of engaging in
“provocations” in pursuit of “their own selfish interests.”
He also (credibly) claimed that China, as a major trading power,
would never pose a threat to (civilian) freedom of navigation in any
international waterway, especially the South China Sea. The two most
anticipated speeches, namely by Carter and Sung, underlined the depth of
strategic faultlines in the region. Instead of providing reprieve, or
facilitating a modus vivendi among parties concerned, the
Shangri-La Dialogue simply exposed the fracturing pan-regional security
architecture and its potentially disastrous consequences for Asia. The
South China Sea has become Asia’s new battlefield.
Richard Javad Heydarian is a political science professor at De La Salle University, Philippines, and the author of “Asia’s New Battlefield: US, China, and the Struggle for Western Pacific”
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-south-china-sea-asias-new-battlefield-16538?page=2
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