What can the U.S. and its allies do about it?
"We were not isolated in the past, we are not isolated and we will
not be isolated," Chinese Admiral Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of general
staff of the People's Liberation Army, exclaimed during the
recently-concluded Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. It was a direct
riposte to U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter’s earlier speech at the
same event, where he warned
China against “self-isolation” due to its aggressive maneuvers in
adjacent waters. Not short of bravado, the Chinese admiral went so far
as stating Beijing does not "make or fear trouble" against the
"provocations of certain countries for their own selfish interests." The
speech coincided with reports of China’s back-to-back (unsafe) interception of American surveillance missions in the South China Sea.
Four centuries after the publication of British jurist John Selden’s "The Closed Sea," which argued for exclusive sovereign control of international waters, China is inching closer to transforming the South China Sea—the world’s most important waterway,
which handles up to a third of global maritime commerce, four times as
much energy transport as the Suez canal, and more than a tenth of global
fisheries stock—into a virtual domestic lake. China’s control of the Paracel chain of islands is a fait accompli, while the Pratas
chain of islands are under the administration of what Beijing considers
as a renegade province, Taiwan, which will be eventually reincorporated
into a Greater China. In the last two years or so, China has reclaimed
3200 acres (1,295 hectares) of land to build gigantic artificial islands
in Spratly chain of islands,
giving birth to a sprawling network of civilian and military
installations across the disputed waters. Soon, China may be in a
position to establish an “exclusion zone” in the area, imperiling freedom of overflight and navigation for regional and external military forces in the area.
Standing next to a top Vietnamese defense official, Deputy Minister of Defense Nguyen Chi Vinh,
he warned that “some countries are expanding their invasion of the
South China Sea”—most likely in reference to allegations that Vietnam
has also engaged in, albeit on a far smaller scale, its own reclamation
activities in the area in recent years. Admiral Sun, however, reserved
his most pugnacious rhetoric for one Southeast Asian country, the
Philippines, which has dared to take its giant neighbor to international court over the maritime disputes.
Starting off on a relatively
conciliatory note, where he proudly enumerated China’s numerous
contributions to global security and development, the Chinese admiral
suddenly shifted to a high-pitch, lambasting Manila for supposedly
breaching bilateral agreements with China and denying its rights in the
disputed waters. He warned the Philippines and other likeminded
countries that “Chinese people believe in truth, not heresy” and that
“belligerence doesn’t make peace”. Quite astonishingly, he accused the
Philippines of becoming “the first country to invade the South China
Sea”, recounting how he internalized this humiliating event during his
younger years as a serviceman.
Admiral Sung was also adamant that from
the perspective of (Chinese) history, the South China Sea belongs to
Beijing. And that this is a self-evident truth. It was a speech that was
both disconcerting and surreal, especially when one takes a close look
at actual realities on the ground. The sheer scale, speech and technological sophistication of China’s reclamation activities, the ever-larger deployment of Chinese fishermen-cum-militia forces,
the augmentation of Chinese submarine and naval presence in the area,
not to mention an uptick in Chinese aerial interception of foreign
reconnaissance aircrafts in the South China Sea – they all underscore
Beijing’s intent on dominating what it describes as its blue “national soil”.
Requiem for Global Commons
"The Sea, by the Law of Nature or Nations, is not common to all men, but capable of private Dominion or proprietie as well as the Land," Selden wrote in the The Closed Sea (Mare clausum) in 1635. It was a direct rebuttal of Dutch Jurist Hugo Grotius’ influential book, The Free Sea (Mare Liberum),
which served as the foundation of modern international law,
particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). For Grotius,
high seas are global commons that, by their very nature, should be
accessible to the entire humankind on a non-exclusive basis.
Over the next two centuries, America introduced the Monroe Doctrine as a justification for domination of the Americas, to be followed by Alfred Thayer Mahan’s
call for American domination of adjacent waters, beginning with the
Caribbean. America’s quest for naval domination would extend, over the
next decades, across much of the Pacific Ocean, culminating in the
occupation of the Spanish-controlled Philippines during the twilight
years of the nineteenth century.
Over the past seven decades, however, America has served as a largely benign naval behemoth, serving as the anchor
of the regional liberal order, which has undergirded a robust
free-trade regime that has lifted one Asian country after the other,
including former adversaries like China, from the depths of poverty to
the heights of unprecedented wealth. But all of this could change,
thanks to China’s embrace of Seldenean notion of ‘Closed Sea’ and Mahanian doctrine of dominating adjacent waters. No less than the South and East China Sea have, as I argue in my latest book, turned into “Asia’s new battlefield” for domination.
As the President Xi Jinping bluntly put it,
in their view, all the “islands and reefs in the South China Sea are
Chinese territory since ancient times.” Leaving little doubt as to
China’s determination to assert its historical claims in the South China
Sea, Xi warned, “Chinese people will not allow anyone to infringe on
China’s sovereignty and related rights and interests in the South China
Sea.”
One Southeast Asian country, however,
has taken up the cudgels for international law and the protection of
global commons. Through its historic arbitration case,
which is expected to finalize in coming weeks, the Philippines hopes to
leverage the UNCLOS to not only protect its sovereign rights, but also
question the validity of China’s expansive claims, which are based on dubious historical arguments.
Deus ex machina
Over the past year, a growing number of countries have come to support the Philippines’ arbitration case. All the members of the Group of Seven (G7)
industrialized powers, Australia, and almost all relevant players in
the region have openly or indirectly expressed their support.
In fact, Indonesia and Vietnam,
which are observers at the Philippine-initiated arbitration
proceedings, have even gone so far as threatening a similar action
against China, which has stepped up
its fishing activities and paramilitary patrols far into Vietnamese,
Malaysian and Indonesian waters. A panicked China has lashed out at the
arbitration proceedings and in a comically desperate fashion has sought
to undermine the legitimacy of the arbitration body by setting up its own international courts and rallying up to forty countries, mostly poor and many landlocked, to question the Philippines’ arbitration maneuver.
But the election of Rodrigo Duterte, a tough-talking provincial
mayor, as the Philippines’ new president could inject some uncertainty
into the picture. A self-confessed “socialist”, known for his long-established ties with leftist-Communist groups in the Philippines, incoming President Duterte has openly called for
direct engagement with China and, if conditions permit, expressed his
willingness to negotiate a joint development agreement in disputed
waters. For him, what matters more is reviving long-frayed bilateral
ties and welcoming more Chinese investments in the country.
During one of his campaign speeches, he went so far as stating
that if China will “build [the Philippines] a train around Mindanao,
build [the Philippines] train from Manila to Bicol . . . build [the
Philippines] a train [going to] Batangas, for the six years that I’ll be
president, I’ll shut up [on the sovereignty disputes].” Given the depth
of anti-China sentiment
among ordinary Filipinos, Duterte was clearly not interested in scoring
electoral points when he uttered those controversial words.
Meanwhile, he has openly cast doubt on the utility of the Philippines’ arbitration case as well as the existing security alliance with the United States. Though it is unlikely that Duterte, who is relying on the advice of seasoned former military officials
on matters of national defense, will downgrade Manila’s alliance with
Washington or drop the arbitration case, it is not clear whether he will
fully leverage the likely favorable outcome of the arbitration case
against Beijing. A Duterte administration may mean improved bilateral
relations with China, but at what cost? Reopening communication channels
with China may lead to demands for certain Filipino concessions on the
arbitration case as well as security agreements with allied nations. One
thing though is for sure: While America and its allies scramble for
unity on the South China Sea issue, China is gradually turning the South
China into an extension of its continental territory.
Richard Javad Heydarian teaches
political science at De La Salle University, and formerly served a
policy adviser at the Philippine House of Representatives (2009-2015).
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-slowly-turning-the-south-china-sea-its-own-territory-16554?page=4
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